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The beneﬁts of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and in particular GPS have been
demonstrated worldwide, and continue to accrue in the form of new applications. Today,
some mission critical applications (largely driven by safety) mostly in aviation and to a lesser
extent maritime, rely on a number of techniques for the provision of integrity monitoring
services. However, for many applications such as those associated with the emergency
services, road user charging and personal navigation devices, no such monitoring exists and
service validation is limited due to technical and cost constraints. The problem is exacerbated
by a recent increase in more challenging problems, particularly in the security industry, in
which jamming devices have been used to disrupt the use of GPS. This paper presents a new
approach for a cost effective local solution to the problems above, at the individual user level,
by providing the user with information on Quality of Service (QoS). The approach is based on
the deployment of a single or network of probes supported by an existing regional network.
The probes communicate with a central server and are designed to detect localised events
whilst the regional network isolates space segment anomalies. The latter is addressed in detail
in this paper in terms of design methodology and performance, using the Ordnance Survey’s
UK GNSS network.
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1. INTRODUCTION. The beneﬁts of Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) and in particular GPS have been demonstrated worldwide, and continue
to accrue in the form of new applications. Many of these applications are mission
(e.g. safety) critical, in the sense that if the service fails (provides a signiﬁcantly
erroneous solution without annunciation within a given time) or is unavailable
(provides no solution or one with an insufﬁcient guarantee), users are either placed in
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danger or negative ﬁnancial and/or social consequences may occur. Today, mission
critical applications (largely driven by safety) mostly in aviation and to a less extent
maritime, rely on one or more of Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS),
Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) or Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM), and its variations for the provision of integrity monitoring
services. However, for many applications such as those associated with the emergency
services, road user charging and personal navigation devices, no such monitoring
exists and service validation is limited due to technical and cost constraints. The
problem is exacerbated by a recent increase in more challenging problems particularly
in the security industry in which jamming devices have been used to disrupt the use of
GPS. Furthermore, operations in challenging dynamic surroundings such as container
bases and ports mean that the signal multipath and blockage environment is also
dynamic. These complex situations make the detection, identiﬁcation and isolation of
failures a very difﬁcult process.
The GNSS Availability Accuracy Reliability anD Integrity Assessment for timing
and Navigation (GAARDIAN) system is designed to offer a cost effective local
solution to these problems at the individual user level, by providing the user with
information on Quality of Service (QoS). The system is based on the deployment of a
single or network of probes supported by an existing regional network. The probes
communicate with a central server and are designed to detect localised events whilst
the regional network isolates space segment anomalies. The GAARDIAN system
design includes novel techniques for the reduction of data transmitted between the
probe network and server.
2. GAARDIAN SYSTEM DESIGN.
2.1. High-Level System Architecture. The design of the GAARDIAN architec-
ture consists of three main elements: probe, server and communication. The probe acts
as a semi-portable station that executes specialised functions to detect failures, store
data and reduce the amount of data to be transmitted to the central server. The
server’s role is to manage and process the data received from probes and external
sources including the Ordnance Survey (OS) network. The server offers the users real-
time access to the output of the probes (including anomalous events) and dedicated
system (GPS and eLORAN) positioning/timing performance. Furthermore, it
provides the probes with information on failures that have a regional impact. The
GAARDIAN system schematic is shown in Figure 1.
GAARDIAN’s QoS monitoring is designed to be ﬂexible depending on the user
application and the associated requirements. However, following a detailed review of
user requirements, a minimum number of speciﬁc activities have been determined as:
. Interference Detection
. Failure Identiﬁcation
. Required Navigation Performance (RNP) compliance
. Scientiﬁc data capture during interesting events
. eLORAN validation.
The speciﬁc functionality of the probes and the server, summarised above, are based
on these activities. For example, the detection of local anomalies such as jamming is
only possible if space segment borne failures are discounted. Similarly, space based
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failures contribute to user level (position domain) performance measured in terms of
the relevant RNP parameters. For these two reasons, the server is designed to host the
Space Segment Health Monitor (SSHM). It employs the UK regional OS network
together with special algorithms to detect regional events. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the server architecture and functionality.
2.2. Server Design. The GAARDIAN server has a number of roles which it
executes either in real-time or on demand. It provides a platform for the internet-based
user interface or ‘dashboard’ from which users are able to access real-time monitoring
updates, stored data and performance statistics. In addition to allowing access to
events detected at the probes, the server engine amalgamates data from a number of
sources to facilitate a decision based QoS algorithm, whose functions include:
. Notice Advisory to NAVSTAR Users Interface (NANUI)
. Navigation Message Check (NMC)
. Space Segment Health Monitor (SSHM)
. Ionospheric Monitor (IM) (proof of concept only)
The NANUI checks for NANUs from the US Coast Guard Navigation Centre
(Navcen) on behalf of the GPS Wing/2SOPS. NANUs inform users of impending
satellite maintenance due to planned manoeuvres, clock swaps and operational
procedures, and associated changes to constellation health.
The NMC validates the navigation data utilised by the probes. Firstly, a reference
navigation message is derived from the data received from the OS network, excluding
any erroneously demodulated parameters as outliers. Then, as part of the SSHM, an
arc of the estimated satellite trajectory is generated for this reference navigation
message within its period of validity before being differenced from an arc computed
from the International GNSS Service (IGS) Ultra-Rapid predicted orbits. Once the
reference navigation message is veriﬁed, the probe navigation messages may be
checked. This is achieved by computing a series of parity checks of the navigation
Internet
GAARDIAN Server
User
IGS Server
GAARDIAN Probe
OS Server
Figure 1. GAARDIAN High level architecture.
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message parameters, essentially reducing the data at each probe before communicat-
ing it back to the server. These checks are then compared at the server to the
equivalent codes for the reference message.
Finally, the IM is included in the initial design to facilitate proof of concept in terms
of the potential impacts of ionospheric anomalies which may be misinterpreted as
space segment failures or localised effects.
3. SPACE SEGMENT HEALTH MONITOR.
3.1. Failure Considerations. Underpinned by system requirements, the role of
the Space Segment Health Monitor (SSHM) is to detect space and control segment
borne anomalies and to provide a real-time estimate of the Signal-in-Space (SIS)
errors (e.g. satellite orbit and satellite clock range). Failures which are the result of
onboard events or errors in processing and uploading information to the satellite
are either fully correlated or very highly correlated spatially. To facilitate the design
of the SSHM, the relevant failure modes must ﬁrst be identiﬁed together with
their characteristics. The control segment failures may be the result of bad data from
the monitor stations, software bugs, hardware malfunction, human error or incorrect
upload. These failures would result in incorrect parameters being included in the
navigation message transmitted to users, either in the ephemeris and clock correction
values or the health and accuracy states. Satellite failures are also capable of impacting
the orbit and clock directly due to unplanned physical effects within the active on-
board atomic standard or potentially as a result of a satellite manoeuvre whose
status is not updated in a timely fashion as part of the NANUs. Signal generation
failures are also possible in the form of an evil waveform distortion which can
have variable impacts on signals and their users. Table 1 summarises the relevant
failure types.
The majority of the space segment failures manifest as ramp/run-off or step-like
errors. Therefore, the SSHM must be designed to protect against such failures and
enable their early detection. To attain this goal, SSHM employs multiple monitors as
described in section 3.3.
3.2. GPS Data Network. The UK based prototype implementation of the
GAARDIAN system employs real-time GPS data from the OS network. Figure 2
shows all the OS network locations and those selected for use in the SSHM. The sites
are chosen to maximise satellite coverage as they rise above and fall below the horizon
(or mask angle). Implementations in other regions would likely follow the same
methodology to maximise satellite coverage.
Table 1. Space and Control Segment Failures (Milner, 2009).
Failure Mode Segment Type Magnitude
Clock Phase Jump Space Step 30m
Clock Frequency Shift Space Ramp <0·05m/s
Excessive Clock Acceleration Space Ramp rate N/A
Thruster Firing Space Ramp 0·0–10·0 m/s
Orbit + Clock Modelling Error Control Step/Ramp 5·0m+
Upload Error Control Step/Ramp 0·00–2·00m/s
Incorrect Health Status Control Ramp N/A
Evil Waveform Control Step/Variable <10m
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3.3. Monitor Design. The failure modes in Table 1 form the basis for the
design of the monitors to be employed to determine the health of the space segment.
The ﬁrst class of failures relates to the reliability of the navigation message. Sudden
Figure 2. Ordnance Survey Network and GAARDIAN SSHM Sites (with permission of the OS).
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physical effects such as clock anomalies or manoeuvres of which users are not
correctly informed (either as a result of wrong satellite health status or failure to issue
the appropriate NANU) are not likely to impact the navigation message instantly.
They are only indirectly inﬂuenced following signal reception at the monitoring
stations. Although the use of the broadcast navigation message at the OS network
within a positioning based monitoring solution would likely determine a failure within
the navigation message had occurred, a simpler solution may be obtained using the
International GNSS Service (IGS) Ultra Rapid orbit and clock products. The
comparison between the two orbits and clock solutions forms the ﬁrst monitor in the
SSHM, as described in Section 3.3.1.
The second class of failures cause a sudden jump in the Instantaneous User
Range Error (IURE). Such failures are step or bias like in nature and may be the
result of a clock phase jump or other signal generation anomaly such as an evil
waveform. To monitor such failures, real time processing is required. A simple
code based step detector provides the necessary protection as described in
Section 3.3.2.
Finally, ramp like or ramp rate errors are characterised by a progressive increase in
the IURE. These failures may develop very gradually such that detection using the
step detector is achieved only after a signiﬁcant period of operation. To enable early
detection of these errors, a ramp error detector has been developed using time-
differenced carrier phase measurements. This is described in Section 3.3.3.
This parallel bank of three monitors is designed to enable early detection of failures
with minimum false alerts. This is achieved by setting ﬂexible thresholds, either from
existing standards (DoD/DoT, 2008) or empirically on the basis of previous data,
thereby automatically adapting to current performance.
3.3.1. NavigationMessageMonitor (NMM). A reference message is determined
from the most recently received and demodulated message at the IGS and OS
network. Each message is designed to be applicable for a period of two hours.
Validation of the message is only undertaken once three separate OS stations have
decoded the message and relayed it to the central GAARDIAN server. This is to
ensure that the correct demodulation has been performed and to prevent possible false
alerts from potentially less reliable data at low elevations (Beyerle et al., 2009).
A satellite trajectory arc is computed from the resulting navigation message using
the standard algorithm (e.g. Hofman-Wellenhof et al, 2001) at regular intervals. The
resulting Cartesian positions are compared to the equivalent positions determined
from Lagrange interpolation of the IGS Ultra Rapid orbits, thereby producing an
estimate of the 3D error vector. Similarly, an estimation of the satellite vehicle clock
offset is determined from the three broadcast parameters and compared to the
equivalent IGS Ultra Rapid clock product. An estimation of the User Equivalent
Range Error (UERE) is derived from the Signal-In-Space Range Error (SISRE)
formula, expressed in Malys et al. (1997) as:
SISRE =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
(R− CLK)2 + 1
49
( )
(A2 + C2)
√
(1)
where: R=radial ephemeris error; CLK=SV clock phase error (m); A=along track
ephemeris error; C=cross track ephemeris error.
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Alternatively, either the worst user location over the UK region (Feng and Ochieng,
2006) or a ﬁxed user location may be used to project the 3D position vector to the user
range domain.
3.3.2. Code-Based Step Monitor (CBSM). The design and development of the
step detector initially considered a number of different approaches to estimate the user
range error, i.e.:
. Independent stations, full positioning solution
. Independent stations, single satellite differences
. Network batch processing
The ﬁrst approach uses the standard positioning algorithm and compares the ranges
used in the ﬁnal iteration to the known geometric ranges taking into account the
necessary corrections. However, the observability of the range error is reduced due to
the potential for a proportion of it to be assimilated within the estimated clock bias.
The second approach is formulated to overcome the shortcoming of the positioning
solution approach. Instead of determining a position solution, it computes the
difference between pairs of satellite ranges (single difference across satellites). These
observables are then differenced from the corresponding ones from computed
geometrical range pairs to generate an error estimation metric. In this approach, the
receiver clock bias is eliminated through differencing. However, on detection of a
gross error, the identiﬁcation of the failed satellite would rely on analysing multiple
pairs containing the satellite in question which would overcomplicate the failure
detection process. Furthermore, the use of a differenced observable as the basis
for a test statistic increases the variation in its values. This is as a result of the law of
error propagation which accounts for the stochastic behaviour of both satellite
measurements.
The network batch processing approach combines the measurements received from
all stations in the network into a single least squares estimation or ﬁlter. However, the
requirement for real-time operation adds a level of complexity. Furthermore, there is
an added complexity associated with the detection and exclusion of malfunctioning
stations.
The approach taken for the CBSM is to estimate the receiver clock bias while
holding ﬁxed the known coordinates of the stations. In addition, to avoid the
dependency outlined above, this estimation is undertaken for a series of subsets,
sequentially removing each satellite. The estimates for the user to satellite range in
question are derived from the receiver clock bias estimation which does not utilise the
pseudorange measurement concerned, thereby preserving the independence between
the satellite-user range error to the receiver clock bias. This process is intended to
maintain robustness and reliability of the monitoring scheme. Naturally, the removal
of a satellite has a detrimental impact on the geometry. A measure of the magnitude of
this impact can be obtained from the Dilution Of Precision (DOP), comparing the
full and subset values. The (Time) DOP is deﬁned from the scalar (as a result of
constraining the solution) cofactor matrix Q as follows:
TDOP = NameMeNameMeNameMeQ√ (2)
Q = (ATA)−1 (3)
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C
..
.
C
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

 or A = 1...
1



 (4)
(expressing clock error parameter in seconds as opposed to metres)
Q = 1
nc2
or Q = 1
n
(5)
TDOP = 1NameMeNameMe
n
√ (6)
From this analysis it is clear that the impact of degrading the geometry through
removal of a single satellite is minimal and is bounded by a maximum factor of 1·2
relating to the drop from ﬁve to four satellites in view.
The error estimation is repeated for each station and the median of the derived
metrics for each satellite is taken as the statistic for fault detection. A parallel
assessment of the worst case station is performed to isolate poor performing stations as
and when required.
3.3.3 Time Differential Carrier Phase Monitor (TDCPM). In order to detect
ramp errors it is possible to utilise the code measurements processed in the CBSM to
detect accumulated errors. However, the lower noise level associated with carrier
phase measurements presents the possibility of a more precise estimation. Carrier
phase positioning usually involves integer ambiguity estimation required to enable the
absolute range to be determined. This is a complex process which, given the aims of
GAARDIAN, is unnecessary. However, detection of relative errors or temporally
growing errors does not require knowledge of absolute ranges as time differenced
measurements are sufﬁcient. On this basis, time differenced carrier phase measure-
ments are used in a similar fashion to the code-based step detector, estimating the rate
of change in the clock bias between epochs.
Like its code-based counterpart, this detection function is immune to isolated
receiver failures such as cycle slips. The use of the median operator over the station set
maintains robustness against any errors which are not observed at the majority of
stations. This should also reduce the impact of noise on the signal delay residual and
receiver errors.
3.4. Threshold Setting and Detection. The aim of the SSHM is to detect gross
errors and failures originating from the control and space segments. In order to set a
detection threshold for the CBSM and TDCPM, estimates of the variances of the
metrics are needed to relate performance to known predeﬁned detection probabilities
which are closely related to integrity. Standards have been deﬁned for the Signal-
In-Space (SIS) which account for range and range rate performance up to the point of
transmission. The satellite broadcast User Range Accuracy (URA) quantiﬁes the SIS
ranging performance. However, as the GAARDIAN network is ground based,
additional error variances must be included to estimate the accuracy of the UERE.
The variance may be deﬁned empirically through testing and characterisation or by
the use of models. Models for the UERE variance are well deﬁned in many
applications (e.g. ICAO, 2006):
σ2user = σ2URA + σ2iono + σ2tropo + σ2mpn (7)
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where σiono
2 is the variance of the ionospheric range residual after correction using the
single frequency model, σtropo
2 is the variance of the tropospheric model and σ2mpn is a
measure of the multipath and noise.
A deﬁnition of failure with a corresponding threshold is also speciﬁed in the
GPS Standard Positioning Service (GPS) Performance Standard (DoD/DoT, 2008).
A failure is deﬁned to occur when the SIS error exceeds 4·42 times the User Ranging
Accuracy (URA) variance and is expected to happen with an integrity risk
(probability of occurrence) of 10−5 per hour per satellite. However, although this
deﬁnition may be viewed as a potential basis for failure detection, it relates to the
expected system performance and may not equate to speciﬁc user requirements. The
ﬂexibility of the GAARDIAN concept relies on the ability of users to set their
requirements in terms of a prescribed integrity risk (puser). Therefore, the threshold for
detection is deﬁned as follows:
T = Q−1( puser, σuser) (8)
where Q−1( ) is the inverse Gaussian function. The metrics used in the CBSM and
TDCPM may be overbounded by a Gaussian distribution function with zero mean
and standard deviation σuser.
For the range rate measurement relevant to the TDCPM, expected variances are
not well established. There is no speciﬁed standard for the User Range Rate Accuracy
(URRA) but a 6-sigma upper bound of 0·02 m/s over three seconds at any Age of
Data (AoD) is stated for design purposes (DoD/DoT, 2008). This equates to
σURRA=0·0033 m/s. However, the impact of changes in the atmospheric delays,
multipath and noise over the measurement interval are not accounted for. One study
of ionospheric delay effects on the range rate measurement found that, at a low point
in the solar cycle, variations of 0·005 m/s were observed, averaged over a minute.
These values are expected to be three times greater at solar maximum (Doherty et al,
1994). Further variations may be expected from changes in the tropospheric delay,
multipath components and receiver noise which varies over a 1 s period. The degree of
temporal correlation which determines the variation of these error sources may also
vary over time. For these reasons, it is more appropriate to utilise an empirical
estimate of the expected magnitude and deviation of the TDCPM metric, determined
from the previous day’s data.
Figure 3 provides the schematic for the SSHM including the parallel operation of
the CBSM and TDCPM. The green components refer to the treatment of the
instantaneous user range error estimates for each satellite and each station. On taking
the median over all stations, the metrics relate to a per satellite basis, highlighted
in red.
4. SSHM OFFLINE TESTING.
4.1. Fault-Free Data Analysis. Initial testing of the monitoring network and
algorithms involved the processing of the observed measurements to generate the
required CDSM and TDCPM metrics. This checking and validation mechanism
is ﬁrst used to isolate any stations in the network which are not providing high
quality data relative to the network. For October 2010, the “GORS” station (Figure 2)
was found to most frequently give the highest results for the TDCPM metric
as shown in Figure 4 (left). However, for the same period, a relatively even
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distribution of worst stations was found for the CDSM metric, shown clearly in
Figure 4 (right).
The occurrence of such network anomalies may be easily overcome by using a
neighbouring station such as “ALDB” (shown nearby in Figure 2) to replace the
“GORS” stream.
Figure 3. SSHM Monitoring Process.
Figure 4. Worst station TDCPM (left). Worst station CBSM (right).
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In the following analysis, the median station values are used for the CBSM and
TDCPM test statistics. An initial observation of the output data suggested that
satellites at low elevations with low station coverage generated larger values for the
test statistics, as expected from the impact of elevation dependent error sources. These
two variables are highly correlated, although other data shortages can occur for
satellites at high elevations. Figure 5 presents the TDCPM metric as a function of
satellite coverage, i.e. the number of stations tracking and observing the respective
satellite. It is clear that outliers are more prevalent when coverage is low. Similarly,
Figure 6 shows that the majority of outliers in the TDCPM metric are at low
elevations.
On the basis of these results and the poor performance of satellites with low
coverage and at low elevations, monitoring status levels can be deﬁned to facilitate
high usability and applicability to the GAARDIAN dashboard user interface.
Speciﬁcally, four possible categories are identiﬁed. These are No Coverage, Observed,
Monitored and Gold Monitored, deﬁned as follows:
. No Coverage: Satellite is below the horizon and invisible to all stations in the
network.
. Observed: The satellite is visible and measurements are being received by at least
one station in the network.
. Monitored: The satellite is above a 5° mask angle for at least three stations in the
network at which measurements are being received.
. Gold Monitored: The satellite is above a 30° mask angle for over half the network
stations (nominally >7).
Figure 5. TDCPM vs. Satellite coverage.
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The gold monitoring cut-off of 30° was chosen as improvements in the CBSM and
TDCPM test statistics begin to tail off or even worsen beyond this elevation as shown
in Table 2.
The motivation of multiple monitoring states (for each satellite) is to facilitate a
more informed failure detection and annunciation process whilst reducing the number
of false alerts issued to users. This is achieved by deriving thresholds based on different
error variance over-bounds for each monitoring status. The tightest of these will be
implemented for gold monitoring due to the excellent observability of any gross errors
in this state. This relationship is shown in Figure 7. In the optimal case of gold
monitored, the detection threshold (between amber and red regions shown in Figure 7)
is low as a result of the tight bound on error estimation. An even tighter threshold is
used to warn of a potential problem but which could also be due to noise and small
biases, including those originating at the station. Formonitored satellites these bounds
are both relaxed to higher values. An observed satellite is one from which
Table 2. Elevation statistics.
Elevation Cut off Code Metric mean Code Metric std. dev. TDM mean TDM std. dev.
5 1·2358 0·8575 0·0055 0·0095
10 1·1390 0·8269 0·0031 0·0023
15 1·1265 0·8295 0·0030 0·0023
30 1·1132 0·8048 0·0031 0·0022
45 1·1191 0·8303 0·0032 0·0024
Figure 6. TDCPM vs. Elevation.
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measurements have been received but, due to low station coverage, reliability cannot
be assured and as such a warning must be given even for low error detection metrics.
4.2. Fault Detection.
4.2.1. Failure Tests. To evaluate the ability of the monitors to detect the relevant
failures, a number of tests were performed. Real data were used from the selected OS
stations shown in Figure 2 with the addition of simulated failure modes used to reﬂect
those listed in Table 1. Table 3 lists the failure models applied.
In order to capture a large sampling size, 15 days of 1 Hz data (10/2010) were used
over the 15 station network. This equates to around 108 measurements. The failure
model is applied to a satellite until detection by either algorithm occurs, following
which the failure is reset and the detection process recommenced. The tests were
performed for each visible satellite sequentially to capture all available modes.
4.2.2. Fault Detection Performance. The CBSM may utilise an empirically
derived variance or the value deﬁned by equation (1). In the case of the TDCPM,
an empirical value is used, formed from the previous 24 hours data for the entire
constellation. The step error tests 1 to 4 in Table 3 produced the intuitive results of a
Table 3. Applied Failure Models.
Test No. Failure Type Magnitude
0 None −
1 Step 20m
2 Step 10m
3 Step 5m
4 Step 2m
5 Ramp 10m/s
6 Ramp 1m/s
7 Ramp 0·1 m/s
8 Ramp 0·01m/s
Figure 7. Monitoring Status.
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step-like form in the CBSM and a spike in the TDCPM. It is natural that in the online
implementation, a moving window of a few samples is employed for the TDCPM to
protect against large noise spikes. The CBSM is able by design to efﬁciently protect
against step failures of magnitudes above the user-derived threshold. This has been
veriﬁed for all tests listed in Table 3 using the selected data set described.
The large ramp errors employed in tests 5 to 6 in Table 3 (10 m/s and 1 m/s) show a
clear signature in both the step and ramp detectors, with early detection occurring in
both monitors. Results obtained from repeated application of the 0·1 m/s failure in
test 7 show clearly the beneﬁt of the TDCPM in terms of early failure detection. The
time series of the two detection metrics for one such case are shown in Figure 8. The
TDCPM in Figure 8 (right) provides early detection within the moving window time
frame (*5 s), whilst the code based step detector may take up to aminute to reach 6m.
At the more sensitive level of a ramp of 0·01 m/s for test 8, the observability of
failure in the ramp detector reduces as the signal approaches the nominal noise levels
of 0·002–0·005 m/s for the majority of geometrical conﬁgurations. During nominal
Figure 8. Ramp error (0·1 m/s): (left) CBSM (right) TDCPM.
Figure 9. Ramp Error 0·01m/s.
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performance, when only very small biases are present in the range rate observables, a
marked change in the detection metric is observed as shown in Figure 9. However,
when performance is degraded, the detection metric can exceed 0·01 m/s without the
addition of the simulated failure. Therefore, these very slowly growing errors would
likely only be detected if the user requirements are such that false alerts may be
accepted in order to implement tight detection bounds, coupled with a preceding
period of good performance leading to a tight estimation of the empirical variance
over-bound.
5. CONCLUSIONS. This paper has presented a regional space segment health
monitoring solution to support the GAARDIAN project. The monitors presented in
the proposed approach facilitate the identiﬁcation of space and control segment borne
failures to enable alerts to users to be issued and to assist the locally installed
GAARDIAN probe network. The SSHM utilises multiple detection functions to
maximise the probability of detection and to ensure early detection of all relevant
failure modes. A robust approach to the design of a test statistic is taken to minimise
the impact of receiver-based errors and immunise against cycle slips. Furthermore, the
algorithm feeds into the GAARDIAN’s high-level Quality of Service algorithm to
generate a health quotient on a per satellite basis. This is a useful service for users that
do not possess a RAIM functionality or require customisable monitoring.
The regional monitoring solution as part of GAARDIAN has been demonstrated
for a subset of the UK Ordnance Survey network. Results show that ramp errors as
low as 0·1 m/s are detected reliably by the system which may feasibly detect more
subtle failures dependent upon user requirements.
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